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Abstract 
Conventional wisdom holds that new product development is more successfully undertaken 
when design is user-led. An exception is the luxury goods sector, in which a common 
presentation of the brand is one where the customer should aspire to the vision of its 
designers. In such cases, the proprietor is often cast as a connoisseur, an expert in the 
brand’s history who is intuitively able to give vision and direction. Within the Swiss luxury 
watch industry, heritage and the illusion of exclusivity are vital strategies in the 
communication of products as luxury items. Connoisseurship plays a central role in this 
communication, establishing the boundaries of brands whose products might otherwise 
appear similar. In such cases, connoisseurship is presented to the customer as superior to 
user research, engendering products with a sophistication which customer insights cannot 
provide. Nonetheless, whilst conventional user research methods play little part in the 
design of Swiss watches, less formal methods are employed. These are shown to also have 
application in non-luxury sectors too. The utilization of strategies employed by the Swiss 
watch industry in future scenarios of new product development is also discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Historically, definitions of design within new product development have typically 
understood the consumer as external to the process (e.g., Holmes & Azam, 1995; Pahl & 
Beitz, 1996). However, in recent years, products which integrate the needs of users at the 
specification and design stages have increasingly been recognized as better able to address 
those needs, leading to greater consumer satisfaction and, ultimately, greater profitability 
(Design Council, 2008; Vredenburg, Mao, Smith, & Carey, 2002). Strategies such as user-
centred design and co-design have emerged to systematize the integration of user needs 
into the design process (Sanders & Stappers, 2008). Whilst the implementation of such 
strategies is often criticized as misguided or ineffectual (Goodman-Deane, Langdon, & 
Clarkson, 2010; Steen, 2011), it is now commonplace for brands to talk of the extent to 
which they are customer-driven (Binder, Brandt, & Gregory, 2008). 
A notable exception to this focus on satisfying the expressed wishes of consumers is the 
luxury goods sector, in which “classical marketing is the surest way to fail,” (Bastien & 
Kapferer, 2009, p. 2). The aura which surrounds such products is built, in part, on luxury 
brands’ communication of the notion that their products have innate qualities which are 
only appreciable by those with sufficient sophistication (Twitchell, 2002, p. 98). Asking 
consumers what they want is clearly inconsistent with such myths: instead a common 
projection is that of the proprietor or designer as connoisseur, steeped in the heritage of 
the brand yet effortlessly able to carry it forward. 
This article presents two cases from the Swiss watch industry—Ulysse Nardin and Bell & 
Ross—whose brand communications deliberately and consistently present connoisseurship 
as a substitute for user research. It begins by discussing how the history of watch 
manufacturing has led to a situation in which “Swiss Made” has become synonymous with 
the notion of both technical quality and luxury. It then contrasts the traditional, 170-year 
history of Ulysse Nardin with the much shorter lineage of Bell & Ross, and shows how 
both draw on similar notions of the gifted auteur to establish their brand messages. The 
article explores how both brands successfully reconcile the marketing paradox inherent in 
combining the exclusivity of “craftsmanship” with the desire for growth in sales, and 
illustrates the role of the connoisseur in negotiating this union in ways which are 
meaningful to their customers. 
The article then goes on to demonstrate that despite messages to the contrary, both brands 
do, in fact, conduct extensive user research, through informal channels such as hospitality 
events, through reports from authorized dealer networks, by the use of personal selling to 
valued customers, and through the use of limited and bespoke editions. This is in contrast to 
more formal user research conducted as part of a systematic and documented process, 
typically involving methods such as surveys, interviews, usability testing, and focus groups 
(Kuniavsky, 2003). Nonetheless, the article concludes that in an industry which has been 
superseded by more advanced, digital technologies, where innovations are incremental and 
where market volumes are relatively low, connoisseurship is an important strategy for 
demarcating the boundaries of more than 200 brands which make up the Swiss luxury 
watch industry. The article ends by discussing whether similar approaches might also be 
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relevant in markets not usually considered part of the luxury goods industry, and how such 
approaches might be implemented. 
2. The Swiss Watchmaking Industry 
Watchmaking in Switzerland first appeared in the mid-sixteenth century, initially as a 
response by goldsmiths to Calvinist reforms that prohibited the wearing of jewellery 
(Fédération de l’Industrie Horlogère Suisse FH, 2014). Unlike the English watch 
industry, which in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was driven by the demands of 
maritime exploration and trade (Smith, 2009), in Switzerland improvements to watch 
design were driven largely by fashion and taste (Glasmeier, 1991). This placed the Swiss 
industry in a commanding position as watches became more affordable and, through the 
adoption of mass production technologies at the beginning of the 1900s, Switzerland 
established its domination of the world watch market (Knickerbocker, 1974). 
This domination continued until the 1970s, when the introduction of quartz technology, 
combined with integrated circuitry, decimated the Swiss industry. Competitors from the 
U.S., Japan, and Hong Kong were able to produce watches which were simultaneously 
much cheaper but also far more accurate and, in 10 years, Swiss exports fell from 40% of 
the world market to only 10% (Glasmeier, 1991). Factories were forced to close, and many 
brands were consolidated or bought out. 
Throughout the 1980s and to the present day, the Swiss watch industry has undergone a 
remarkable transformation, on two fronts. First, SMH (Swiss Corporation for 
Microelectronics and Watchmaking Industries Ltd, one of the conglomerates formed by the 
merging of previously independent companies, renamed The Swatch Group in 1988) 
introduced Swatch, a precision-engineered quartz analogue watch, which once again 
signalled Swiss dominance of the low-cost fashion market (Norman & Verganti, 2014). 
Partly on the back of this success (Swatch Group owns the Breguet, Blancpain, and Omega 
brands, amongst others), Swiss watchmaking then aggressively marketed itself as the 
epitome of “fine timekeeping.” The notion of Swiss-made luxury was carefully managed 
and assiduously protected: in order to claim “Swiss Made” at least 60% of components by 
value must be Swiss, and assembly and inspection must take place in Switzerland. The 
success of this strategy is demonstrated by the statistic that, in 2011, Switzerland 
manufactured only 2.6% of the world’s watches by volume, yet accounted for 54% of the 
market by value (Deloitte, 2012). 
2.1. Ulysse Nardin 
While it does not have the public recognition of brands such as Rolex or Patek Phillippe 
among watch connoisseurs and collectors, Ulysse Nardin is regarded as one of the most 
innovative (Barge, 2012), having been awarded more patents than any other watchmaking 
company. Established in 1846, the company initially made marine chronometers before 
expanding to manufacture pocket and wristwatches. Patents and prizes awarded in the late 
nineteenth  and early twentieth centuries attest to Ulysse Nardin’s reputation as the leading 
pocket chronometer maker (Jaquet, Chapuis, Berner, & Guye, 1970, pp. 177-179), but after 
World War 2 the brand’s reputation diminished and it existed only as a minor player among 
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the Swiss manufacturers. This changed in 1983 when the company was acquired by Rolf 
Schnyder. In 1985 it unveiled the Astrolabium Galileo Galilei, which entered the Guinness 
Book of World Records as the most complex watch ever made (Paige & Schnyder, 1999), 
thus presenting the brand’s vision of itself once again as a leading Swiss watchmaker. 
Nowadays the company is known for other innovations, particularly its perpetual calendars 
and jaquemarts, its “Freak” carrousel tourbillon, and the use of synthetic materials such as 
silicium and polycrystalline diamond within its watch movements. 
2.2. Bell & Ross 
Bell & Ross was founded in 1993 by Bruno Belamich and Carlos Rosillo. Initially working 
in partnership with German watch manufacturer Sinn, the brand is known for large, legible 
displays intended to replicate aircraft instrumentation. 
One of the youngest of the Swiss watch brands, Bell & Ross is now part-owned by Chanel 
and headquartered in Paris, though manufacture and assembly is based in La Chaux-de-
Fonds in Switzerland. Unlike many other brands, including newer entrants to the market 
such as Urwerk and MB&F, Bell & Ross has not attempted to make a name for itself 
through the design of new complications. Instead it has sought to establish its reputation 
through association with organizations such as Recherche Assiance Intervention Dissuasion 
(RAID), the French counter-terrorism unit, and Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie 
National, the French hostage rescue unit (Hahn, 2012). In this way the company has 
become known as a maker of tough, reliable, and overtly masculine watches. 
3. Connoisseurship and Exclusivity 
Within the luxury industry, exclusivity is a vital strategy in instilling products with value. 
Connoisseurship plays a central role in this strategy, establishing boundaries and 
differences between brands whose products might otherwise appear similar. To appreciate 
the importance of connoisseurship in the creation of Swiss watches, it is first necessary to 
understand a fundamental difference between traditional approaches to product marketing 
and the marketing of luxury goods, namely the importance of exclusivity. Traditional 
marketing practice involves attempting to raise demand as high as possible, while ensuring 
that that demand can be met. Demand (i.e., popularity) is advertised as proof of the 
product’s worth (Apple, 2011; Jeong & Kwon, 2012; Tucker & Zhang, 2011). Such an 
approach is tantamount to heresy for the luxury brand however, which continually strives to 
emphasize how few people have bought a particular product. Kapferer and Bastien (2009) 
highlight the counterintuitive nature of luxury marketing strategy: “In order to enter the 
luxury market, to build a successful luxury brand and to make it remain a luxury brand, one 
has to forget the classical marketing rules” (p. 312). An emphasis on rarity, often to the 
point where the customer must wait for the product to be made and delivered, is a key 
example of this principle. 
3.1. Artificially Induced Rarity 
A product’s rarity, and the associated exclusivity of ownership which follows, are crucial for 
charging high prices (Kapferer, 2012) and maintaining the allure of the brand. Historically 
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such rarity resulted from the use of materials whose supply was limited—precious metals, 
gemstones, exotic animal skins, and so forth. More recently however, modern industrial 
mining methods and the farming of previously rare animals have reduced the natural scarcity 
of such materials. One response of the luxury industry has been to seek out even less readily 
available supplies—platinum and rhodium, for example, or aerospace-grade ceramics. 
Another has been to communicate a material’s scarcity, even when such rarity is a myth 
(Epstein, 1982). The requirement for rarity is also at odds with the desire of luxury brands to 
increase sales, in particular in emerging markets such as China and Russia. As Catry (2003) 
makes clear, “all companies in the luxury goods market face the question of whether 
exclusivity, so central to luxury appeal, is inevitably diluted by increased market share” (p. 
11). To resolve this apparent paradox, luxury brands have engaged in the creation of 
“artificially induced” rarity (Kapferer, 2012), one in which “the product is not objectively 
limited in supply but luxury firms give their buyers an illusion of rarity through the 
information they deliver” (Catry, 2003, p. 17). This communication of artificial rarity, and the 
illusion of exclusivity it creates, is a strategy at which the Swiss watch industry excels. 
3.2. Multiple Brands 
Swisstime, which advertises itself as “the reference for Swiss watches” (Swisstime, 2015), 
lists 561 watch brands, of which approximately half are regarded as true watchmakers 
(usually defined by enthusiasts as those which manufacture their own movements). One 
feature of the Swiss watch industry’s contraction in the 1970-1980s was that few brands 
disappeared; despite being bought out by other manufacturers or absorbed into 
conglomerates, brands were retained as distinct entities. The Swatch Group, for example, 
owns 18 brands including Blancpain (established in 1735), Breguet (1775) and Omega 
(1848). Similarly Richemont owns 12 brands including A. Lange and Söhne (1845), 
Jaeger-LeCoultre (1833), Piaget (1874), and Vacheron Constantin (1755). 
Retaining a high number of brands is one way in which Switzerland’s watch industry has 
retained an aura of exclusivity. The history and heritage of each brand allows it to tell a 
distinct story to its customers, disguising the nature of its owning group’s corporate 
structure. Furthermore, Swiss brands individually manufacture relatively few watches 
each year: Patek Phillipe, for example, produces approximately 40,000 units annually 
(KPMG, 2008). Thus a significant number of individual and distinct brands, each 
manufacturing small numbers of products each year, ensure that even while the total 
number of watches sold is significant (in 2011 Switzerland produced 31 million pieces 
[Mégevand, 2015]), the ability to appear exclusive is preserved. 
3.3. The “Ebauche” Tradition 
The high number of Swiss luxury watch brands also disguises another aspect of the 
industry, namely the production of mechanical watch movements by what is known as 
the “ebauche” tradition (Perez, 2000). Luxury watch brands pride themselves in their 
production of movements, and almost all incorporate complications manufactured in-
house in their high-end and signature pieces. However, the majority of brands also use 
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) suppliers of movements in their lower price 
models, both to reduce costs and to concentrate on those aspects which bring most value 
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to the brand, such as the design of the visible exterior of the watch. In addition, the 
provisions of Swiss law require that a brand which claims its product is “Swiss Made” 
must use a Swiss movement (Fédération de l’Industrie Horlogère Suisse FH, 1995). This 
has led to a situation in which only five manufacturers (ETA, Frederic Piguet, Sellita, 
TechnoTime, and Zenith) supply movements to the whole of the Swiss industry. Thus, at 
least at the lower end of the market, many brands share the same internal movements, 
despite their dissimilar outward appearances (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. The Ulysse Nardin Maxi Marine Chronograph and the Bell & Ross BR03-94 
share the same ETA 2894 movement. 
Note. ETA is owned by Swatch Group. As well as manufacturing under its own name, 
ETA also sells movements using the brand names Valjoux and Lemania. Blancpain, 
which is also owned by Swatch, manufactures movements under the brand name Frederic 
Piguet, but only supplies to Swatch Group brands. 
The ebauche tradition is therefore an instrumental part of the production of artificial 
rarity, in that it allows the continuation of small, distinct brands which would otherwise 
be unable to manufacture highly sophisticated movements (Baker, 2000). However, it 
also plays a further role in the perception of exclusivity, in that it provides brands with 
platforms on which to create many variants of the same product. The supply of 
movements by an OEM demands that brands incorporate a modular (rather than 
integrated) architecture within their designs, one in which, simplistically, the movement 
can be “dropped in” the watch case. This in turn allows brands to create small production 
runs of watches whose internal configuration, parts, and assembly are identical. The 
power of a system in which multiple designs can be created using the same internal 
movement is illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. 42 Bell & Ross watches using the ETA 2892A2 movement. 
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3.4. Limited Editions 
In parallel to the strategy of small production runs, the Swiss watch industry also uses 
limited editions to artificially induce exclusivity. Limited editions may incorporate a new 
design, such as the Ulysse Nardin Tellurium J. Kepler, limited to 99 pieces, but are more 
typically variants of standard designs, incorporating new material or colour combinations 
such as the Ulysse NardinAcqua Perpetual, limited to 500 pieces (Figure 3). In both 
cases, production is limited to a predetermined number of pieces even if customer 
demand suggests that more units should be manufactured. This not only generates 
publicity (brands will often announce limited editions at major trade fairs such as 
Baselworld), it also ensures a second-hand market amongst collectors in which prices are 
kept high, further adding to the reputation of the brand. 
 
Figure 3. The Ulysse Nardin Acqua Perpetual Limited Edition, numbered 397 of 500 
pieces. 
4. Connoisseurship as a Substitute for User Research? 
In The Luxury Strategy (2012), Kapferer and Bastien note 24 ways in which traditionally 
accepted marketing principles are abandoned in the marketing of luxury goods. These 
include seemingly paradoxical strategies such as “forget about positioning” (p. 65) and 
“raise your prices to increase demand” (p. 75). Of these 24 principles, which they term the 
“anti-laws of marketing,” five are directly concerned with ways of ensuring the customer’s 
needs and wishes are kept apart from the product design and development process: 
(a) Do not pander to your customer’s wishes 
(b) Do not respond to rising demand 
(c) Dominate the client 
(d) Do not test 
(e) Do not look for consensus 
Such approaches are further supported by Okonkwo (2007, pp. 132-133), whose seven 
stages of new product development in the luxury goods industry makes no mention of the 
consideration of user requirements during the generation or selection of new product 
ideas. 
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This disregard of customer needs is a deliberate and considered strategy. As Kapferer and 
Bastien (2009) make clear, nothing could be more alien to the luxury brand than 
“involving customers in the shaping of a brand, in co-creation, in consumer 
empowerment and in creating a relational intimacy” (p. 318). Consumers do not purchase 
luxury products because those products meet their functional needs; rather they do so 
because luxury products “fulfil ego and self-esteem needs, reinforcing social status and 
projecting a self-image” (Okonkwo, 2007, p. 62). A luxury brand which sought to portray 
itself as subservient to its customers’ needs would thus destroy the image which caused 
its customers to aspire to it. By not listening to customers however, an obvious danger is 
that the luxury brand might appear directionless, either following whimsical trends or 
endlessly reinterpreting its own history. It is in giving luxury brands direction that the 
role of the connoisseur is critical. 
4.1. Connoisseurship and Luxury 
Connoisseurship is intimately related to luxury because of luxury’s intimate relationship 
with heritage and exclusivity. Heritage gives luxury brands depth and prestige (Kapferer, 
2012). It is a core characteristic of a luxury brand (Okonkwo, 2007, p.105), and it is the 
reason why previously referred to brands such as Blancpain and Breguet advertise their 
date of establishment so prominently. In parallel with this exclusivity, style acts as the most 
important marker of exclusivity in products whose functionality (as in the case of ebauche 
tradition movements) is indistinguishable. Thus the connoisseur, whose credibility relies on 
a sense of history and a “commit[ment] to the idea that style is meaningful” (Neer, 2005, p. 
7), is essential to the customer’s belief in the validity of a luxury brand. 
The connoisseur within a luxury brand has a dual role: not only to give creative direction to 
the brand’s products as well as its image and communication, but also to act as a figurehead 
(Catry, 2003). This is not the same as that conventionally referred to in the literature of 
connoisseurship. The purpose of the art connoisseur, for example, is not to create new 
work, but rather to apply a considered discrimination which “helps him or her make a 
sophisticated judgment about the worth of a piece of art, a judgment that employs criteria 
appropriate for the genre in which the artist had worked” (Donmoyer, 2005, p. 78). 
Nonetheless, the skills of the art connoisseur are precisely those which the luxury brand’s 
director must also employ. 
Connoisseurship requires “judgment informed by intuition . . . but only if grounded in a 
thorough understanding of the work itself” (Robinson, 1998). It demands the application 
of discerning opinion, however that opinion only gains validity through a foundation of 
historical knowledge (Neer, 2005; Schwartz, 1988; Van Rees, 1989). Furthermore, an 
appreciation of quality is fundamental, since “distinctions of quality are both a tool and a 
goal of the practice of connoisseurship” (Ebitz, 1988, pp. 208). An identifiable figure 
possessing these skills is also essential to a luxury brand’s image. Within the Swiss watch 
industry this is typically the proprietor in the case of long-established brands, though with 
newer entrants to the market the figurehead is often a designer. In both cases though, and 
unlike those who gave their names to many Swiss brands, the connoisseur is rarely 
trained as a watchmaker. 
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4.2. Connoisseurship and Heritage 
The notion of the Swiss watch connoisseur as a devotee and defender of heritage is 
crucial to the luxury brand’s presentation. In some cases (e.g., Audemars Piguet, Panerai, 
and TAG Heuer) this is achieved by the involvement in the business of family 
descendants of the original founder. In other cases the allusion to heritage must be more 
carefully constructed. Thus, in the case of Ulysse Nardin, the corporate myth is of Rolf 
Schnyder, an adventurer and visionary who “had a problem accepting the rules” (Ulysse 
Nardin, 2011), yet who “found his calling, to restore one of the world’s greatest names in 
high-end watchmaking to its former glory” (New Sabah Times, 2010). Since Schnyder 
had no previous involvement in Ulysse Nardin’s history, it was imperative that his name 
be tied to the brand’s heritage in other ways. His biography therefore talks of resurrection 
and rebirth, and “the opportunity to be involved in one of the truly great names in 
horology” (Wikipedia, 2015). Schnyder’s name and his recognition of Ulysse Nardin’s 
historic achievements and value are consistently intertwined, such that the brand’s vision 
and future direction are indistinguishable from his own. 
For a company such as Bell & Ross, whose history is only two decades old, the task of 
invoking the heritage of connoisseurship is more complex. It is achieved through the 
brand’s designer and co-founder, Bruno Belamich, whose story is one of a “passion for 
the ‘instrumentation’ look” (Thompson, 2010, p. 114) of aircraft control panels. This is 
enhanced, and historicized, by references to Belamich’s internship with the watchmaker 
Sinn, founded in 1956 by pilot and flight instructor Helmut Sinn. Finally, it is grounded 
in the often told challenge of co-founder Rosillo to Belamich to “go back to our roots” 
when designing the BR-01, which was to become the icon of Bell & Ross’s style. These 
roots were not those of a brand established in 1994 however, but rather the control panels 
of vintage aircraft. 
The distinctive style of Bell & Ross watches is further legitimized through their use by 
professionals such as pilots, deep-sea divers, and bomb disposal experts, a fact mentioned 
in virtually all articles about the brand (see, e.g., Disher & Rosillo, 2002; Hahn, 2012; 
Müller, 2012). Yet despite an aesthetic which, it is implied, is highly valued by such 
users, nowhere is it suggested that the needs of such professionals might be taken into 
account when designing the watches. To do so would devalue the second requirement of 
the luxury connoisseur figurehead, that of being the creative visionary. 
4.3. Connoisseurship as a Source of Brand Vision 
Schwartz (1998) writes: 
The connoisseur’s sensitivity to style, at its best, can be compared to the ear 
of the musician with absolute pitch, the feeling for numbers of the 
computation whiz, the hunch of the crack detective or the practiced 
diagnostician. Without being able to tell us how they know certain things, 
they are sure that they do, and we believe them. (p. 261) 
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This ability to see what others do not is of central importance to the luxury brand. Since 
luxury products are aspirational, their design cannot be grounded in the requirements and 
experiences of their customers. Instead, according to Kapferer and Bastien (2012), luxury 
“is the expression of a taste, of a creative identity, of the intrinsic passion of a creator” (p. 
62) and “comes from the mind of its creator, driven by a long-term vision” (p. 65). In the 
case of Bell & Ross, this vision manifests itself in the image of Belamich as the “Young 
Turk,” eager to shake up the traditional industry with products “way beyond the 
specifications that most watchmakers boast in their trendy catalogues” (Belamich, 2012). 
For Ulysse Nardin, the approach is subtler, with Schnyder cast as the inheritor of the 
founder’s vision, as his company biography relates: 
he has enabled Ulysse Nardin to transcend its past and achieve an even higher 
place in the rarified constellation of watchmaking’s legends . . . the spirit of 
the watchmaker Ulysse Nardin has . . . become inextricably intertwined with 
Schnyder’s own. (Wikipedia, 2015). 
Throughout the Swiss watch industry similar stories are invoked, though each with their 
own individual flavour. At Carl F. Bucherer, for example, the company’s owner is the 
founder’s great grandson, ensuring “the founder’s philosophy continues to characterize 
the brand” (Carl F. Bucherer, 2013); at Patek Phillipe the father and son presidents 
“personally stand by all the commitments embodied in the Patek Phillipe Seal” (Patek 
Phillipe, 2013) and advertise using the slogan “you never actually own a Patek Phillipe. 
You merely look after it for the next generation” (Leagas Delaney, 2013); while at 
Graham—“an unrepentantly English name for an exquisitely English watch” (Graham, 
2013a)—the seventeenth-century watchmaker “would have been proud” of the founder’s 
drive to “create a form of mechanical perfection that doesn’t look or feel like just another 
Swiss watch” (Graham, 2013b). 
4.4. User Research within Luxury Brands 
While the public presentation of a luxury brand precludes an interest in its customers’ 
needs, in reality a significant amount of user research does, in fact, take place. This is not 
to say that luxury brands covertly engage in conventional practices such as questionnaires 
or focus groups, but rather that user insights are gained through less formal and more 
subjective methods. Some of the ways in which Swiss watch brands gather information 
about their customers’ aspirations and requirements include the following. 
4.4.1. Hospitality 
The provision of hospitality, whether at sporting events such as Wimbledon (sponsored by 
Rolex), cultural institutions such as the Bolshoi Ballet (sponsored by Audemars Piguet), or 
prestigious trade events such as the Monaco Yacht Fair (sponsored by Ulysse Nardin), is 
one of the most important ways in which luxury watch brands engage with their customers. 
Such events bear little resemblance to more conventional user research exercises: 
participants will be invited rather than recruited; “research sessions” will be more akin to 
friendly chats than formal interviews; and no attempt will be made at either consistency or 
impartiality. Yet the outcome, particularly when the event involves the brand’s connoisseur 
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figurehead, will be the accumulation of many small insights into the lifestyles of the 
brand’s best customers (Tynan, McKechnie, & Chhuon, 2010). These insights may never 
be formally recorded, but they will inform, or reinforce, the connoisseur’s vision of how the 
brand should move forward. 
4.4.2. Authorized Dealers 
In accordance with Kapferer and Bastien’s (2012, p. 67) instruction to “make it difficult for 
clients to buy,” most Swiss luxury brands sell exclusively through authorised dealers or 
their own boutique stores (Okonkwo, 2007, p. 80). While the primary purpose of such a 
strategy is once again to communicate exclusivity, it also ensures the customer is served by 
trained staff with an understanding of, and loyalty to, the brand. This in turn provides a 
deep vein of customer insight into perceptions of the brand and why one product is 
purchased rather than another. 
4.4.3. Limited Editions 
As previously detailed, limited editions are production runs of designs where the number of 
pieces manufactured is deliberately restricted. As there is no expectation of high volume 
sales, a brand which is uncertain of a particular design is able to test it by launching the 
product as a limited edition and gauging its success. It the product sells well, a very similar 
design can be launched as a standard edition. 
4.4.4. Bespoke Editions 
Bespoke editions allow a small number of highly valued (typically wealthy) clients to 
request a unique treatment of a design, which will not be offered to other customers. 
Bespoke pieces are generally considered highly confidential and it is rare to find details of 
either the designs or the customers who commissioned them. There are exceptions to this. 
An exception is Andrew Luff, a collector who has ordered a number of bespoke pieces. A 
typical bespoke design exercise will involve a commissioned piece, based on a model that 
already exists, and customization will “include dials and cases with personalized designs 
and engraving as well as technical details such as adding functions to existing calibers . . . 
Movement parts, such as rotors and bridges, can be hand-engraved or skeletonised as the 
client wishes” (Doerr, 2009, p. 85). Bespoke editions therefore provide brands with insights 
as to future themes which products may explore. 
4.4.5. Mass Customization 
Mass customization is defined as a flexible production system allowing individual products 
to be manufactured with near mass production efficiency (Tseng & Jiao, 2001). It is usually 
enabled by a web browser interface, known as a toolkit, which allows customers to 
experiment with different configurations in order to arrive at their ideal product (Hippel & 
Katz, 2002). Within the luxury industry it has yet to find widespread adoption (Okonkwo, 
2007, p. 247), though a number of brands such as Fabergé and Jaeger-LeCoultre have 
attempted to reconcile the apparent tension between the need for exclusivity and the 
ubiquity of the Internet. For brands which do adopt mass customization, the opportunity 
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exists to gather data in a similar way to that offered by bespoke customization, though with 
a much wider customer base. 
5. A Model to be Emulated? 
According to Tynan et al. (2010), “luxury goods sit at one end of a continuum with 
ordinary goods, so where the ordinary ends and luxury starts is a matter of degree” (p. 
1157). Despite an earlier insistence that luxury goods and everyday consumer goods are 
fundamentally different (Kapferer & Bastien, 2009), Kapferer (2012) appears to agree, 
writing that the “luxury business model can be applied to companies in any sector” (p. 
456), citing Apple as an example of a non-luxury brand which adopts some of the traits of 
the luxury business model (this observation has become even more pertinent following 
the launch of the Apple watch, particularly the gold edition, and more recently its 
partnership with Hermès). It is therefore of relevance to consider ways in which non-
luxury brands may utilize some of the strategies of luxury marketing, and the 
implications of doing so. 
One of the most immediate ways in which Apple has previously adopted the strategy of 
luxury brands is in the position of the connoisseur, a role which Steve Jobs performed at 
least as well as his contemporaries in the Swiss watch industry. Following his death, 
numerous commentators wrote of Jobs’s “genius” (Gillmor, 2011; Isaacson, 2011; The 
Economist, 2011) and the ways in which other companies might follow Apple’s lead. 
Undoubtedly the strategy adopted by Apple has been successful—it commands 
considerable brand loyalty and for a time was the world’s most valuable company 
(Benzinga Insights, 2012). 
A second way in which Apple emulates the strategy of luxury brands is in its attitude to 
user research and the extent to which it informs design. Apple’s presentation of itself as a 
company which takes no account of user requirements is notorious, as exemplified in 
Jobs’ exclamation: “How can I possibly ask somebody what a graphics-based computer 
ought to be when they have no idea what a graphic based computer is?” (Kahney & 
Sculley, 2010). By creating an image of the brand, and its connoisseur figurehead, as one 
which knows what is best for consumers—better, indeed, than they know themselves—
Apple clearly follows Kapferer and Bastien’s (2012) command not to pander to 
customer’s wishes. As such it has become something of a cause célèbre amongst 
designers annoyed by the extent to which they are required to take account of user needs. 
Yet by dividing opinion with this apparent disregard for its customers’ requirements, 
Apple merely follows another of Kapferer and Bastien’s instructions not to seek 
consensus. 
A particularly interesting aspect of Apple’s reputation with regard to user research is the 
way in which, similarly to luxury brands, it is largely a false construct. As Jobs himself 
admitted, Apple makes extensive use of user testing (Seeking Alpha, 2010), and the 
information gathered informs product development. Furthermore, Apple’s own stores 
(and in particular the “Genius Bars” where customers receive one-on-one advice about 
their products) are rich sources of information with regard to consumers’ use of products. 
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Writing of the way in which tool-less additive manufacturing (AM) technologies enable 
small production runs, Campbell, Hague, Sener, and Wormald (2003) have suggested the 
potential for the bespoke industrial designer. Such a designer would clearly have much in 
common with the designer of today’s Swiss watches, who emphasize limited editions and 
low manufacturing cycles. While luxury brands engage in such strategies to promote 
exclusivity, they nonetheless create a marketplace in which many more variants exist than 
with conventional, mass-produced products. In addition, despite its apparent lack of 
enthusiasm for mass customization, the flexible modularity which such systems demand 
(Pine, 1993) is also closely aligned to the modular architectures required by the ebauche 
tradition of manufacture. Thus, designers working for luxury brands, who are skilled at 
the creation of difference while simultaneously consolidating a brand’s image, may find 
those skills are also ones which non-luxury brands find valuable as AM technologies 
become more common. 
The bespoke industrial designer may also find it necessary to adopt their luxury 
strategies. Speaking at a Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and 
Commerce (RSA) event titled Twenty-First Century Manufacture, Aldersley-Williams 
(2011) proposed that “in the coming decades, what we may see is that design and 
manufacturing look less like they did in the 20th Century, and more like they did in the 
14th.” In such a future, designers exploiting the ability of AM technologies to create 
unique designs may find themselves working directly with customers, following 
instructions in the manner of pre-Industrial Revolution craftsmen, and thus resembling 
those engaged in the creation of luxury bespoke designs. 
One final scenario in which more conventional design practices might emulate those of 
luxury brands concerns longevity. It is a core principle of sustainable design that the 
lifespan of products should be increased (Cooper, 2010; Spangenberg, Fuad-Luke, & 
Blincoe, 2010). Yet this also appears to be at odds with consumerist desires to discard 
and replace products with newer models. However, this conflict between longevity and 
consumerism is one which luxury brands navigate with ease. Luxury products such as 
Swiss watches have well-established logistics of service and repair, and a vibrant second-
hand market also contributes to their increased lifespan. Clearly the cost of a luxury 
product plays a significant role in the deciding the ease with which it is discarded. 
Nonetheless, looked at over the product’s lifetime, a luxury watch may cost little more 
than the buying and replacing of successive products. Thus, it may be that the luxury 
business, often regarded as the epitome of consumption, offers clues as to how to 
conceive sustainable design processes in future. 
6. Conclusions 
This article has demonstrated how the traditional rules of product marketing are 
overturned by the luxury goods industry, which deliberately creates an illusory image of 
rarity and non-consensual customer engagement in order to invoke an aura of exclusivity. 
Central to this strategy is the role of the connoisseur figurehead, depicted as effortlessly 
able to direct the brand through the application of a unique vision, rooted in the 
company’s history. While this research has concentrated on the examples of Ulysse 
Nardin and Bell & Ross within the Swiss watch industry, the importance of heritage and 
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the role of the connoisseur are similarly recognizable in the luxury sector of industries 
such as fashion (e.g., Chanel, Dior, and Dolce & Gabbana), automotive (e.g., Bugatti, 
Ferrari, and Rolls Royce), and wines and spirits (e.g., Dom Pérignon, Glenmorangie, and 
Moët & Chandon). 
A key role of the connoisseur figurehead lies in convincing a brand’s customers that it is 
indifferent to their needs and wishes. This presentation lies at the heart of Kapferer and 
Bastien’s (2012) “anti-laws of marketing,” and is necessary for the portrayal of the luxury 
brand as aspirational: as emblematic of status which the customer is privileged to attain. 
Yet as this article has shown, the notion that luxury brands do not engage in user research 
is largely untrue—while research may not resemble that recommended in traditional new 
product development literature, it is nonetheless conducted through informal and less 
readily recognized channels. 
Through the example of Apple, this article has also indicated how brands not 
conventionally thought of as luxury can successfully adopt luxury strategies where these 
support its business strategy. Clearly Apple does not follow a luxury business model in 
all its operations: its outsourcing of production to China and its increase of production to 
meet demand are clear violations of the “anti-laws” of marketing. However, for a 
company with a figurehead able to emulate those in luxury industries, the image of a 
brand led by a visionary connoisseur can be a powerful marketing tool. Yet Apple also 
demonstrates the risks encountered by brands that invoke connoisseurship without the 
additional support of heritage, so well understood within luxury industries. With Jobs no 
longer the guiding figurehead, it is by no means clear that Apple can continue to build on 
its previous successes (BBC News, 2013). Thus companies attuned to new production 
paradigms such as mass customization and additive manufacturing, engaging with the 
necessities of sustainable lifecycle management, may instead be those best suited to adopt 
the strategies of luxury brands. 
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